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Structural Principles 
in Emanuele Severino’s Thought
The essay focuses especially on the three structural principles that sustain the entire
proceeding of Severino’s thought and that refer to and imply one another. The first one is the
principle of non-contradiction, in Parmenides’ interpretation and not in the Aristotelian
interpretation. The second one is given by the statement, of Hegelian and Gentilian origin,
according to which every meaning – that is, every being as a signifier – necessarily implies
the totality in its concrete and exhaustive content, and vice versa. The third one requires that
every being in the earth, which arrives at the horizon of the appearing, is something that
must always be overstepped by another being, and so on endlessly.
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First Part - ON THE ORIGINAL STRUCTURE
Introduction
Before addressing the topic indicated in the title of my speech, I would like
to recall briefly, in this auditorium and in this Brescian headquarter of the
Cattolica University, some facts from Emanuele Severino’s biography, in
particular those concerning his teaching activities (this article is the final
report of the speech of the author at the conference "At the dawn of
eternity", held in Brescia in March 2018).
After his degree in Philosophy, received in 1950 from the University of
Pavia, where he had also been a guest of the Almo Collegio Borromeo,
presenting his final dissertation concerning Heidegger with his never
forgotten Master Gustavo Bontadini, and after becoming a lecturer in
Theoretical Philosophy on the 25th of February 1952, Emanuele Severino
established his lecturing post at the Cattolica University, having received for
that purpose the required authorization from the Sacra Congregazione dei
Seminari e delle Università (Sacred Congregation of the Seminars and of the
Universities) on the 10th of January 1957. 
In the year 1956-57, he already taught a free course in History of
Contemporary Philosophy; later, starting from 1957-58, he was assigned to
teach History of Contemporary Philosophy and History of Ancient
Philosophy for a year at the Faculty of Education and subsequently at the
Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, until, on the 20th of December 1962 he
was called upon to fill the position of full professor of Philosophy at the
Faculty of Education, since he turned out second in a set of three in a contest
for the teaching of Moral Philosophy launched by the University of Genova.
After he started his work on the 1st of February 1963, he also taught a
class in Moral Philosophy for the degree course of Philosophy at the Faculty
of Philosophy and Letters, while he also taught courses in History of
Philosophy, Institutions of Philosophy and Theoretical Philosophy in this
Brescian location, when, starting from 1965, the courses of the detached
section of the Faculty of Education were initiated. And it is interesting to
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remember the judgements that the Council of the Faculty of Education
expressed concerning Prof. Severino’s activity in two different occasions: with
the purpose of accompanying his application for the participation to a
competition for a professorship, the 24th of June 1961, the Faculty writes a
report in which it highlights that “Prof. Severino has surely demonstrated to
fully master the subject and to possess remarkable teaching abilities. His
contribution to the development of the doctrine that inspires the Faculty
itself has converged in a vast series of works […] and has vigorously resulted
not only in his teaching (eliciting the most attentive participation among the
students, vibrant debates and fruitful inquiries), but also in the discussions
with his colleagues and among the ‘Società Italiana per gli Studi Filosofici e
religiosi’ (‘Italian Society for the Study of Philosophy and Religion’)”. 
After the three years probationary period, in view of his confirmatory
application as full professor, he receives from the Faculty Counsil, on the 27th
January 1966, a statement in which it is attested that “in his extremely broad
teaching activity, accompanied by a constant seminar activity that was always
conducted with exemplary commitment and with careful attention to the
different needs of the different groups of students, Prof. Severino has
continued to demonstrate his rare and deep competence in the most diverse
fields of the philosophical research. This is confirmed by both the relevant
number of final dissertations led by him, which earned excellent marks, and
the efficacy and acuity of his relations and correlations during the discussions
for the final degree examinations, by both the constant increase in the
number of young students around him who have already improved their
knowledge in the scientific field, and the relevant interest and fruitful
discussions that his teaching and his publications have raised among the
students and the professors of the University”. 
And who was fortunate enough to be able to attend his classes, as the one
who is speaking to you right now, for a biennium, between 1966 and 1968,
will certainly never forget the rigorous way in  which his arguments were
presented, the solemn calm of his way of speaking, the clarity that illuminated
the depth of his arguments, the supreme and scrupulous command of the
logical passages, the attention to take into consideration questions and
objections, in order to fully and exhaustively give an account of his own
position. 
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Logos and dialogue
Emanuele Severino’s speculative path for over sixty years develops in an
exemplarily coherent and fruitful way: it unravels in a debate with other
philosophical perspectives; at the same time, it shows to be able to face and
resolve the unresolved matters with innovative turning points, not easily
predictable at the beginning, but congruent with the previous path. In
particular, the dialogue with the opposite or differing positions becomes
unavoidable and inescapable, since only by denying its own negation and by
showing that its own negations are resolved in self-denial, the truth can be
affirmed in its incontrovertibility and necessity. The presumption to deny
it, indeed, would imply a contradiction either because it would be in
contrast with other necessarily true propositions, since they belong to the
original structure of truth, or because they would be intrinsically
contradictory, that is, in contrast with the principle of non-contradiction.
Moreover – and this is another point on which Severino methodologically
insists – the different negations, as they concretely present themselves in
history, or which can anyway be hypothesized, must be identified and
refuted: even though the foundation of truth implies that, and is what it is
as long as, it manages to resist to any assault and retort any objection, if the
single negations weren’t refuted and rejected, it would happen that
negations that are only illusory could occur and act like actual negations.
Severino points out indeed: «but if the truth knows a priori that there
cannot be a motivation for every possible form of its negation, and that
therefore every motivation is illusory, it must indeed show its appearance
concretely, since otherwise that which counts as illusory motivation acts as
an actual motivation» (Severino, 1984, p. 70; see also Severino, 1982, pp.
81-84). It can also be hypothesized (and this concretely happened for a
certain period also in Severino’s reflection concerning the relationship
between the basics of logos and the presumed phenomenological experience
of the becoming as the annihilation of the being) that such an assertion,
which cannot be denied, contradicts another one, which belongs to the
original structure of truth: from this would then result a radical aporia,
inside the original structure itself, which cannot certainly be resolved by
sacrificing one of the two assertions, but it cannot be accepted either as a
synonym of the reality of the absurd. In this case, this is, therefore, about
identifying, discovering and removing that element, alien to the original
structure of the truth, which, illegitimately assumed as part of it, elicits the
lamented aporia, that is, the conflict between two mutually contradictory
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propositions, but of which none of them – because of its own nature – could
be denied. In particular, such a case occurs actually, and it does not remain
in the mere hypothetical level, when the conflict between the law of the
logos and the report of the experience concerning the becoming, in its
classic interpretation, happened. As long as that extrinsic element will not
be refuted, the system of truth, which, as such, in its entirety sets itself as
incontrovertible, is only valid in an abstract way and it remains in the aporia
and in the problem and therefore, at least to some extent, in the
contradiction. 
From what has been said it appears that the dialectical dialogue,
interpreted like this, is necessary to the truth in order to affirm and defend
itself and, therefore, it must be concretely and actually pursued: not for a
benevolent personal and subjective sentiment of openness toward the others,
but because the truth itself depends on this dialogue, the philosophical
position of a single thinker not so much. From this point of view, then, «the
logos is dialogue, dialogue between the truth and its negation, outside of
which the truth does not live» (Severino, 1984, p. 69): the condition of the
truth is indeed such that if the incontrovertible foundation guarantees that
its negation is defeated as the universality of negation, it is however not
defeated in all of its possible individualizations, of which that universality is
composed, so that the victory over the negation of the truth at the mere
universal level is still an indeterminate victory, in a manner of speaking only
potential and abstract.
Since the truth is well-founded, it is known that every possible negation
is, as such, defeated, but it is not known how it is defeated yet; the debate
with the different determinations of the negation makes, then, actual that
how and it finally makes the defence of the truth concrete. It follows that the
one who denies the truth or the interlocutor who insists on confuting it,
must not be silenced, nor we must rejoice if he/she is weak and little fierce,
since «his/her silence is the silence of the truth; since if the truth is not
realized as the removal of its negation, it is not realized as the truth either;
however, if the negation, the mistake is silent, the removal does not establish
itself and the truth does not show its value, that is, it does not reveal itself
and so it is not realized as the truth» (p. 68). If the adversary is strong and the
objection is formulated as solidly and rigorously as possible, its confutation
will also achieve a firmer success and the truth will establish itself in a more
secure form.
It must be kept in mind that Severino does not interpret the dialectical
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dialogue as the expression of single thinkers or of single, individual people:
and this for two different kinds of reasons. First of all, during the initial
moment of his reflection (before the latest developments), according to
Severino, the existence of other individuals besides me is, indeed, only a
problem and it is only possible that it can be possible that other people
analogous to me exist and that they possess a conscience that is analogous to
mine and beliefs perhaps opposite and in contrast with one another. In this
sense, I find myself in a privileged situation, from the very point of view of
the original structure of the truth, since I am aware, besides my behaviour,
of my conscience too and my awareness concerning the reality, my feelings,
desires and acts of will, whose reliability I am aware of, while concerning the
others I am only aware of their external behaviour and it is only possible that
to them a conscience analogous to mine is associated. Their beliefs are not
immediately present. Hence, the dialogue and the conflict is not between a
plurality of individuals, but the objections establish themselves only as
propositional contents that presume to deny the original structure: «the
philosophies are many […] but I am the only philosopher, the only
philosophizing that is actually real is mine, the only belief is mine» (p.78)
and the thesis according to which «“the” philosophy is “my” philosophy»
(Severino, 1981, p. 76; see also pp. 119-128) is only apparently paradoxical.
Only in the continuation of his reflection, as we shall see, Severino will found
not only the possibility, but the necessity that other consciences, apart from
the original one are present, when he will demonstrate that, beyond the
original circle of the appearing of destiny, an infinite constellation of finite
circles of destiny must be considered present, in constant dialogue with one
another.   
Secondly, then, the affirmation of the truth does not occur because of
(and thanks to) the work of a single thinker, that is, of an empirical I, but of
the thought as itself, of a transcendental appearing, aware of being self-aware,
which includes in itself every empirical appearing as its object. It is to the
thought, interpreted like this, that the truth discloses, that is, something
manifests itself immediately and the contradiction of the negation of the
immediate (logical or phenomenological) manifests itself to it, and not to a
specific empirical individual. In this regard, in an article entitled Hic homo
intelligit (Severino, 1995, pp. 126-136) Severino explicitly criticizes the
thesis according to which the subject of the process of knowledge is the man,
the concrete human individual, since, when we affirm that “this being
thinks”, we cannot mean that the connection between subject and predicate
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is analytical and identical: in this case, we would actually say that the thought
thinks, that what characterizes and completes this being is only and uniquely
the thought, and we would deny, therefore, its individuality as an additional
and crucial moment: because of this the aforementioned connection, if it
wants to defend the specific subjectivity as linked to the thought must be
synthetic; but, if it does not want to only be merely de facto, but needs to be
necessary, it could not be given by experience, but it should be demonstrated.
Without such a demonstration, saying that necessarily hic homo intelligit is
just a premise, a hypothesis that lacks immediacy and truth. It must be said
that as regards this position Severino has always remained very coherent,
with great clarity: what he affirms with truth is not a point of view or a
personal position concerning the world and what is real, but in philosophy
it has to do with the destiny itself, that is, of what is present in a necessary
way and is as such affirmed by a knowledge that is not mere opinion, but it
reflects and translates what for the Greeks was called epistéme.
Non-contradiction and élenchos
Three are the structural principles that sustain the entire proceeding of his
thought and that refer to and imply one another. 
The first one is the principle of non-contradiction, in Parmenides’
interpretation, according to which “the being is and cannot not be” and not
in the Aristotelian interpretation, according to which, instead, the being, if
and when it is, is opposed to nothingness. This possibility precisely, that the
being is not, is banished from Parmenides’ formulation, which, therefore,
does not entrust the time with the task to settle the contradiction that is
intrinsic to the becoming anymore, but it is affirmed that the being can
never and under no circumstances identify itself with the nothingness: as a
result, it is not possible to say anymore that in the becoming the
identification of the being with the nothingness would be avoided because
the becoming being is before and is not after, since a being would not be
anyway and there would be a moment in which a being would equal to
nothing. And Parmenide’s formulation impedes exactly this identification,
since it simply affirms that the being is and the nothingness is not.
Certainly, compared to the original Parmenides’ formulation some sort of
parricide will however be accomplished by Severino, when he will subsume
again the determinations of the being, the platonic éteron, inside the being
and he will therefore affirm that those determinations too – since they are
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– cannot not be. This way the becoming understood in a nihilistic way – as
the affirmation of the coming from nothing or of the ending in nothing by
the being (and by the single entities that exist) – is excluded. Equally, even
the immediate presence, that can be attested on a phenomenological level,
cannot be denied: if the being is immediately present on a
phenomenological level, its negation is removed because it would be in
contrast with the immediacy of the positive that is present: the immediacy
of the presence of the being excludes its negation and it establishes the non-
contradictoriness of the being in its patency. When the gnoseological
dualism is overcome as an unacceptable premise, the phenomenological
level and the logical one coincide in this Archimedean point, in which the
immediate is in its concreteness. Here emerges also the link that ties
together the non-contradiction principle and the affirmation of the
intentional identity between being and thought, with the consequent
refusal of a “reality per se”, cloudy for the thought and unknowable. 
In defence of this principle there is the élenchos – the specific confutative
argument that Aristotle develops in the fourth book of his Metaphysics –
which Severino, precisely in his essay Ritornare a Parmenide ( Returning to
Parmenides) (Severino, 1982, pp. 19-61; in particular pp. 40-58),
exhaustively and systematically reorganizes in its possible variations and
formulations. Apart from the Aristotelian formulations, according to
Severino, the principle of non-contradiction affirms the universal
opposition of the being and of the nothingness, that is, the opposition of
the positive and the negative: the confutation of those who deny such an
opposition is developed through two passages with an increasing accuracy
and universality of conclusions and results. First of all, it can be observed
that the negation of the universal opposition is the affirmation of an
individuation of the universal opposition, since that presumed negation –
being a certain positive – in order to be that, is opposed to everything that
is different from itself, that is, to its not being. At this point it results that
the negation of the universal opposition is not refuted as such, but it is
refuted in its universality, since at least one specific exemplification of that
universal opposition must be admitted. This way it is said that the negation
of an individuation is an individuation, and so it cannot achieve its aim.
Secondly, it can be observed that not only the negation of the opposition is
distinguished from the other-than-self, but even its terms cannot be
confused with one another, if the negation of the opposition wants to be
such. If indeed I demand to deny the principle, identifying what is different
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(positive and negative; being and nothingness; yellow and red; man and
trireme), it is necessary that the elements that are different from one another
appear and are known as such: otherwise, the opposition would not be
denied, instead, a banal identity would be affirmed among elements
perceived as not at all different from one another. As a consequence, the
identification of the opposites is entirely based on the opposition of the
opposites, that is, the opposition of the opposites can be denied only if it is
affirmed and therefore its negation is entirely based on its affirmation. The
negation of the principle implies exactly the truth of what it wants to deny,
that is, of the principle itself, since, in order to deny, it is necessary that the
negation is asserted as a negation, and not as an affirmation or something
else. This way, we are implicitly compelled to affirm what we explicitly
would like to deny, and we are compelled to pose what we would like to
eliminate exactly in the act itself and with the intent itself of eliminating it.
These earnings will remain as the analysis and the investigation of the
Aristotelian postulate also in the development of the subsequent reflections,
even though they will be inserted in a broader context and will undergo a
radical revaluation. The continuation of the reflection will lead to further
reiterate that the Aristotelian élenchos does not belong to the truth of destiny,
but only to the Western epistéme, considered in its most rigorous role. Since
it is isolated from the truth of destiny, the Aristotelian position takes only the
form of an alteration of the truth of what is original. Separated from the
truth, the language that resounds as similar to the truth, is not the truth, it
is instead its alteration and a deviation from it. 
The principle of non-contradiction, as it is delineated in that essay,
however, even though it affirms the eternity and the immutability of every
being, it does not determine yet what the report of the experience concerning
the becoming of the single beings is, on a strictly phenomenological and
descriptive level. Consequently, it does not imply a specific solution to the
problem posed by the becoming yet, when the becoming is intended as in
the formulation that traditionally – at least starting from Plato and Aristotle
– is given to the matter, that is, the becoming as the passage from
nothingness to the being and from the being to nothingness (or from a
certain not-being to a certain being and vice versa). At first, a solution like
the one glimpsed in an original interpretation of Anassimandro’s postulate
and proposed in the essay: La parola di Anassimandro (Anassimandro’s word)
(Severino, 1982, pp. 391-411) seemed plausible. In that essay it was affirmed
that, even though in the world things are born and die following the order
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of time, «the uncontaminated sphere of the divine, where the being is
eternally in itself» (p. 408), still remains. As Severino will later note, this «is
the extreme attempt to join the testament of the truth of being up with the
nihilistic concept of the becoming» (p. 411). Such an hypothesis of a
solution is later resumed right at the end of Ritornare a Parmenide (Returning
to Parmenides), when, reaffirmed the immutability of the being, in front of
the fact of the becoming intended as the annihilation of the being, it is stated
that «the being as the being, and therefore the entirety of the being, is; and
therefore it is immutable. However, since immutable it hovers over the
becoming being, it transcends it» (p. 59). The immutable includes,
consequently, all the positive that is in what is in the process of the becoming
and transcends it; what is in the process of the becoming, then, is not a
nothing, but it does not constitute a novelty for God, in fact it is already
rescued besides the eternal. However, this draft of a solution could not hide
the underlying grave aporia, determined by the simultaneous presence of two
opposite and irreconcilable needs, the thesis of the immutability of the being
and the presence of the becoming, and by the awareness that none of them
could be sacrificed to the other.    
Starting from the Poscritto (Postscript) (pp. 63-133), the subsequent
reflection – and in this sense the return to Parmenides will be developed in a
renewing and actual loyalty – will highlight that the ancient problem of the
becoming does not exist and is dissolved not as a consequence of just the
application of the first principle, but because of a more adequate reading and
interpretation of the phenomenological report, which attests not the
annihilation of a being and its rising from nothingness, but only its
disappearing and appearing; and together with the being its own appearing
is destined to disappear and appear too – not to be annihilated. The
experience, correctly read and not interpreted according to the tradition of
the Western metaphysics, does not certify the annihilation of the being at all,
but only its disappearing; so that the being, which appeared before, does not
appear anymore and its appearing too, which appeared before, is not
annihilated but is only disappeared. When a being is not present anymore,
its being a nothing does not appear at all, but simply that being does not
appear anymore. Severino reaffirms later, in numerous and increasingly deep
analysis, that in here there is not the risk of an infinite process, since the
appearing is not something external and alien to what appears from time to
time: if this were the case, since every appearing appears, we would go on
infinitely into the series of the new forms of what appears. Instead, the
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different moments of what appears coincide, since, when a being appears,
the appearing of the being, the appearing of the appearing and the appearing
of the appearing of the appearing coincide and, when the being becomes, it
disappears and, with it, its appearing and the appearing of the appearing,
without the manifestation of any form of annihilation.  «The appearing that
starts (or ends) has itself as a content, so that the starting to appear
structurally excludes the starting to be» (p. 110).This alternation, which is
the new face of the becoming that is nihilistic no more, is accomplished
inside the total horizon of the appearing, which, since it is transcendental, is
not prone to any form of becoming, while it is instead the background that
encloses the totality of the beings that appear. 
Hence, since, from the correctly read experience, no annihilation of the
beings emerges, the problem of a contradiction inherent to the becoming –
that is, in the presumed appearing of the annihilation of the being – which
would need to be remedied in order to be able to break even with the
regulation given by the principle of non-contradiction, is not present
anymore. On this substantial point the discussion with Gustavo Bontadini,
which, despite not overcoming the radical opposition between the two
interlocutors, has allowed both of them to clarify their positions, sharpening
the respective arguments and highlighting the essential points of the dissent,
will develop for many years. And right thanks to a reading of the experience
and of its report, Severino refutes the traditional conception of the
becoming, considered nihilistic since it considers indeed proven the evidence
of the annihilation of the being. Since the experience does not comment on
the destiny of the being that does not appear anymore, the principle of non-
contradiction takes over at this point to impose the only possible
interpretation, which becomes necessary since it implies the inconsistency of
all the other alternatives. As can be seen, the ancient distinction between
appearing and being returns here, which in history has had different and
opposite declinations, starting from the ancient thinking. Since the
gnoseological dualism between the being and the appearing has been
overcome, it will not be possible to say anymore that the being is destined
not to appear or that it is alien to the appearing (almost as if the being per se
would be something that, as such, cannot appear), and vice versa, the
appearing will not be an heterogenous or misleading manifestation
compared to the being; but instead the appearing will be the splendor of the
being, i. e. that to which the being, in its fullness and adequacy, is destined.
If the being is immutable and eternal, then, when it does not appear
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anymore, it continues to be, so the sequence present in the becoming proves
the historicity of the ways in which the immutable manifests itself and, at the
same time, the finiteness of the appearing, that is, the proceeding under
which the totality appears, without being ever concretely, and fully, given.
Hence, if a being appears, it certainly is; while, if it does not appear, not only
it is not possible to say that it is no more, but it is necessary to say that it
continues to be, eternal and immutable.    
Abstract and concrete
The second structural principle is given by the statement – of Hegelian and
Gentilian origin – inspired to the dialectic in its fundamental speculative
function, according to which every meaning – that is, every being as a
signifier – necessarily implies the totality in its concrete and exhaustive
content, just like, inversely, the totality necessarily implies all the single
meanings, since it is constituted only in reference to them. On this
fundamental point Severino lingers at great length in his La Struttura
Originaria (The Original Structure) and in his subsequent writings for
different reasons: if a specific predicate befits necessarily a certain meaning, if
the meaning would be considered outside of that relation, it would not be
itself anymore and its position would be the position of something different
form itself (of a not-self ). With this we do not simply want to propose the
(rather banal) observation that A, in relation to B, is not A outside that
relation, but it is asserted that, if the relation between A and B is necessary,
it becomes constitutive of the meaning of A, so that, outside this relation, A
is not itself, but something else. In this regard Severino enunciates a series of
theorems that outline an organic conception of the reality and a view of the
totality as a complex system (Severino, 1984, pp. 186-193). If a being, as
immediately significant, is such because it denies everything that is not itself
(since, this way, the identity with itself is immediately linked to the
distinction-opposition toward what is other from itself ), that is, it denies the
totality of its opposition, then this, the totality, belongs necessarily to the
meaning of that being. And this being will not be itself, but it will be denied,
if with it it will not be also concretely given the totality of the other from itself.
And such a thesis will soon pose a grave problem to which we will come back
later. Thus, every being necessarily implies the totality of the beings.Moreover, a
second thesis must be posed: speaking of the totality, if we observe that it
necessarily includes a certain being – since otherwise it would not be the
totality – this being (just like all the other beings included in the totality)
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determines the meaning of the totality, which, therefore, will not be itself
anymore if it will not refer concretely to all the beings that belong to it. The
totality implies necessarily every being. It must be then concluded that every
being and every meaning necessarily imply every other being and meaning.
Every being necessarily implies every other being.
This series of thesis highlights that the main mistake to repel must be
found in the affirmation of the independence or of the insularity of a
meaning or of a being with regard to all the others. This way Severino
resumes the fundamental basis of the Hegelian position and his organicism:
he rejects the primacy of the unrelated individual, in its independence from
everything else, and he does not accept that the relationship is only
secondary and subsequent with regard to the different things that are in
relation to one another and that these, therefore, must be assumed. On the
contrary: it is only inside the relation that the different signifiers beings are
constituted, since each of them is both identical to itself and different from
all the others, so that the reference to all the others is intrinsically necessary
for every being. Only inside the totality of the system a being is adequately
and fully significant. Thus, referring to the part always implies referring to
the whole, and vice versa.
The entire context in which a being is inserted contributes therefore to
the determination of the being itself and, if that context changes, that being
and its meaning change too and are the same no more. And, however, among
the different contexts in which that being is placed (and in which it assumes
different meanings) there is always an identical moment, which changes in
the different contexts and which however allows to say that in each of them
it is always present. It must not be thought however that the identical
moment subsists separated from the contexts: rather the identity is realized
in different ways, depending on the contextual relations in which it is
inserted.   
Therefore, if a being is posed without posing the totality of the references
that constitute it essentially, that being that we would like to pose is not
posed and the intention to pose it remains frustrated. We are here in the
presence of that contradiction C that in all of Severino’s reflection, starting
from La Struttura Originaria (The Original Structure), plays a fundamental
role that remains unchanged. If it is not taken under consideration and is not
understood in its essence and in its function most of the outcomes of
Severino’s conception are missed. With such contradiction C – here is its
peculiarity – a certain content is not posed and in the same time not posed
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(as happens in the contradictions as normally intended) and that other
fundamental contradiction, because of which the immutability of every
being is denied and we give in to the nihilistic conception of the becoming
and of the experience (as happens in the Western philosophy), is not posed
either, but an inequality is realized between what we intend to pose and what
is instead actually posed, between the concrete position we intend to realize
and the only formal  position that we manage to achieve. With it we demand
to affirm a being without posing with it the concrete and infinite totality of
the references that constitute it and that give to it its full and adequate
meaning. Thus, we come to affirm the finiteness of the I, even when it is in
the truth, since it cannot manifest the concrete totality of the being in its
absolute fullness: from which results that the finite I of destiny, despite being
in the truth, can never align itself with the infinite I of destiny, and it cannot
do so because otherwise the finite would be annihilated in the infinite and
that being, made of the finite I, would be annihilated. And this is impossible.
It follows that the immutable manifests itself only in a processual way, that
is, in a finite way: otherwise, the being that is the transcendental appearing
would cease to be, that is, the immutable horizon in which the moments of
the immutable enter and exit the appearing. 
In this context is located the difference between the concrete position of
a being and its abstract position, between the concrete position of the totality
and its abstract position, since the totality and the original structure are not
denied in their truth and essentiality, but they are not shown in their
concreteness. The abstract concept of the abstract is the position of
something that is not only distinguished from the totality that is essential to
it, but of something that is also separated from it. Almost all the aporias are
actually born from the fact of considering an element as separated and, at the
same time, not separated from a certain constitutive relation. The vice of the
abstract intellect, demands indeed that the element, separated, exists per se
and that (only) in its separated existing per se it is fully itself; but, at the same
time, it considers that element still as a part and not as the totality, because
this way only, if it is a part, it can be separated and the work of separation
can be accomplished: however, right because of this, that element is not
considered as something separate. Such a need for concreteness encourages a
logic of identity, according to which, when an equation between things that
are different is posed (saying, for example, that A is B), we manage not to say
the impossible and not to contradict ourselves, only if A is not intended as a
generic A, but precisely as that A that is together with B and, vice versa, B
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will not be a generic B, but precisely that B that is destined to be together
with A, so that the relation between the two becomes essential and necessary.
Those who know Severino’s different works, in their progressive speculative
development and in their complete and meticulous work and constant
refinement, also know with what persistence and with how much difficulty
he tries to bring out the fact that, in the case of an identification of things
that are different, each element is not the other, while it is destined to enter
in a synthesis with the other, precisely because it is what itis. The affirmation
of the identification is always accompanied by the position of distinction and
of the diversity and it is rather tiring (if not difficult) to make the difference
coexist with the identity of what differs, which would not in turn break in
additional elements that are different from one another that need to be
identified and linked to one another. And here the risk of an endless
regression, always glimpsed, might hide. 
And, as it has been said just above, this contradiction highlights the
finiteness of the finite appearing, in which the concrete totality of the beings
does not appear in its absolute fullness; a structural finiteness, since it could
never coincide with the infinite, concrete and totally unfolded appearing.
Precisely this contradiction and the inequation between finite appearing and
infinite appearing of the destiny is the ultimate foundation of the possibility
of the nihilistic isolation from destiny. If the finite appearing were the
concrete appearing of everything and not only a formal appearing of the
totality, the earth could not be isolated and that event that is nihilism could
not happen either. At this point, however, the question of why the presence
of a finite and only formal appearing of destiny is necessary arises, why we
can only approach Joy and not already be in it. 
Crossing 
The third principle emerges mostly starting from the volume La Gloria (The
Glory), and is later reaffirmed in Oltrepassare (Crossing): it requires that every
being in the earth, which arrives at the horizon of the appearing, is
necessarily not impossible to overstep, but is something that must always be
overstepped by another being, and so on endlessly: «something that oversteps
that is impossible to overstep is impossible» (Severino, 2007, p. 185).
Thanks to this principle not only the possibility (which had always been
allowed and justified), but also the necessity that a plurality of finite ways of
appearing of the destiny exists will be founded; that is, that there is an
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infinite constellation of finite circles of destiny, according to the linguistic
formulation assumed in the most recent works. And this is a conclusion that
arises from a series of very important reflections. On the one hand, we can
ask ourselves why the being, which is the immutable, must appear in a
processual way; which means always in a partial and finite form, as we could
already observe. On the other hand, the question of in what sense and why
this principle will allow us to get out of that form of solipsism, to which
Severino appeared necessarily condemned, when – as we saw – it was
affirmed that, while the immediate presence attested my conscience, besides
my behaviour, this was not the case for the others, so that it had to be
concluded that philosophy came to coincide with “my” philosophy. 
As regards the first issue, it should be noted that Severino starts, so to
speak, from the bottom, that is, from the original circle of the actual
appearing; he does not deduce from certain abstract and a priori conditions,
which prescind from the actual presence, but he moves from the original
point in which that presence is located. And the empirical appearing arrives
inside the horizon of the transcendental appearing, which is immobile not
only because, since it is a being, it is eternal, but also because it constitutes
the ultimate background of the rising and of the setting of every being, the
remaining upon which the becoming beings follow one another and which
is the condition that allows their following one another, but it is not one of
the becoming beings itself. Without the transcendental appearing there
would not be the sight of the arrival of the different beings, whose empirical
appearing rises and sets. The appearing in a processual way, and therefore
the finiteness, is then required both because the arrival demands that
something disappears, and the fact that something arrives is attested by the
empirical appearing, and because otherwise those beings that are the
empirical appearing and the transcendental one, as well as the starting to
appear of a certain empirical appearing on the background of the
transcendental appearing, would be cancelled in their difference. And since
we know that even the empirical appearing, albeit finite, since it is a being
it is eternal, it, when it disappears, will continue to appear (and in this case,
to be) inside the infinite appearing, in which everything appears in its total
concreteness. 
We could however ask ourselves if and why elements (every one of them
or some of them) that appear in the horizon of the transcendental
appearing, although they rise, cannot remain permanent in it and must be
crossed, according to the principle that was now recalled: I believe the
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reasons are different. If all the positive that arrives were impossible to cross
and permanent, the content of the transcendental appearing would move
toward the limit of equalling what is totally and fully accomplished in the
harmony of everything; but this could never arrive as the result of a process
of accomplishment, in which the contradictions of which every moment
that arrives in the earth consists are entirely overcome, right because it is
partial (Severino, 2001, pp. 91-92). The infinite appearing of everything is
originally infinite and total, and it cannot become so, otherwise it would
not be that full concrete totality it is. Hence, what arrives must in turn be
crossed and it cannot demand to be the ultimate elimination of every
contradiction. Moreover, according to Severino, if a content of the
empirical appearing were unsurpassable, it would be assimilated to the
background, to the immutable field inside which the becoming happens,
but which – we know – cannot become, and it therefore cannot undergo
increases or additions. The variants, which are in the becoming, would
become permanent constants, from a content of the transcendental
appearing they would become a moment of it. Certainly, what disappears at
the arriving of something else, continues to appear someway, but indeed as
something that is disappeared.
It follows that, then, – and this is the second issue – that even that finite
appearing, actual and original, aware of itself as I, cannot be the only form
of finite appearing, but it becomes necessary (and not only possible) to admit
that «the being that crosses starts to appear inside another I of the destiny,
that is, inside a circle of the appearing and on a background different from
the original circle and background» (Severino, 2001, p. 185). It becomes
necessary then to pose also an infinite constellation of finite circles of the
appearing, which is beyond and different from the actual and original
appearing, albeit analogous to it: otherwise, the latter, right in its actuality,
would be impossible to cross and it would start to belong to the immutable
background, which is impossible. At the actual appearing these finite circles
appear, but only as abstract, and they do not possess that concreteness the
original appearing has for itself. 
This way, Severino’s reflection gains the foundation of a plurality of finite
ways of appearing, analogous to the original one, and manages to conjugate
the affirmation that the totality manifests itself in its own absolute and full
concreteness and, at the same time, the affirmation of the infinite plurality
of the essentially finite prospects, which more and more completely, but
never fully, match that infinite appearing. 
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